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 Thinking the Unthinkable: States as Public Land Managers 
 Sally K. Fairfax* 
I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to emphasize the importance of thinking broadly 
about public resources. It will do so primarily by focusing on two frequently overlooked 
public resources; state school and trust lands.1 The management of these lands differs 
significantly from the operative on most federal lands. As a result, the story of these 
lands has much to add to our thinking about why we, as a nation, might continue to 
support government ownership and management of extensive land and related 
resources. In addition, state lands have a great deal to teach us about management 
institutions and tools. 
The basics of public resources—why to have them, and the tools and 
institutions for managing them—are timely topics. This nation is in the midst of 
yet another century-long discussion about public land issues.2 Typically the 
debate is intense; characterized by rhetoric and stereotypes that obscure 
fundamental issues. The legitimacy of federal ownership of public lands in the 
west has been a recurring theme. This issue emerges for two reasons. First, the 
conceptual tools for conducting this debate are impoverished and misleading. 
Second, ranchers and other commodity interests have found it fruitful to discuss 
title to public lands, when their actual agenda has been about control of public 
resources. This inadequate framework for discussion has made it possible to 
derail the dialogue onto the merely strategic title issue. 
There has long been a predictable tilt to this title issue. Commodity users and 
states typically align themselves with states rights, arguing for a "return" or a grant of 
*B.A. Hood College (1965); M.A. New York University (1968); Ph.D. Duke University and
M.A. Forestry (1974). Professor and Associate Dean, College of Natural Resources, University of 
California, Berkeley. This article is an outgrowth of the author's presentation at the Natural 
Resources Law Center of the University of Colorado School of Law conference, Challenging 
Federal Ownership and Management: Public Lands and Public Benefits (Oct. 11-13, 1995). 
1. See JON A. SOUDER & SALLY FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS (1996). 
2. The public lands (also known as the "federal lands") have been reviewed
episodically, most recently and with several interesting new twists by Patrica N. Limerick, A 
History of the Public Lands Debates, Natural Resources Law Center of the University of Colorado 
School of Law conference, Challenging Federal Ownership and Management: Public Lands 
and Public Benefits (Oct. 11-13, 1995) (hereinafter Public Lands Conference). 
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the lands to the states in order to achieve less restricted access to these resources 
for their own development. Not unexpectedly, environmentalists and 
preservationists have, in response, reviled the states as managers. While this 
embracing and bashing has continued for decades, no one has paid attention to 
what the states have actually been doing. 
Taking states seriously as land managers and evaluating their constraints 
and potentials is a contribution to the dialogue in and of itself. Nevertheless, 
because appearing to be pro-state is tantamount to being pro-development and 
anti-environment, it is important to clarify the subtexts of this article at the 
outset. My attention to the long ignored state trust lands is not part of a plea, 
explicit or implicit, to turn the federal lands over to the states. Rather, it is my 
intention to demonstrate that state trust lands are our oldest and most durable 
public resource management regime. When considering the appropriate paths 
for public resource management over the next century, it is important to keep all 
of the current programs, including state trust lands and their management, and 
the lessons they provide to us, fully in view. 
My discussion of the state trust land management experience will proceed 
under three headings. The first section describes the inadequacy of our intellectual 
and conversational tools for addressing public resources. How is it, this section will 
ask, that state lands and land managers fell so far into disrepute? The section will 
provide a brief overview of the history of state-federal relations, both in general and 
with respect to public lands management. It will assert that state and federal 
governments go in and out of fashion in long cycles. However, the real target of my 
discussion is the familiar acquisition-disposition-retention triptych that structures 
much of our thinking about public lands history. It is my goal to undo some of the 
damage done by that construct to the states' reputation in the history of public 
resource management and to challenge the currently near-ubiquitous presumption 
of federal dominance in this field. Both the states' invisibility and the inevitability of 
federal primacy are seen herein as artifice. 
The second section will rescue a potential for dialogue from that rather 
disgruntled description of our past conversations in the area. Why, if our tools are 
inadequate and our dialogue is impoverished and largely irrelevant, should we hold 
out any hope for a more meaningful conversation at this juncture? I offer five 
observations that suggest that the dialogue may be more productive this time around. 
The third part of the paper will put some flesh on the bones of the most 
obvious—right under our noses—set of institutional alternatives for thinking about 
public resources, the state lands. It will briefly relate a compressed history of the land 
grant program. A description of the trust notion and how it operates in public land 
management will follow. The basic idea that will emerge is that the state trust lands 
management mandate differs strikingly from the federal multiple use mandate. 
Federal managers are told to manage the lands in the "combination of uses 
that best meets the needs of the American people.3 This flaccid direction is 
3. 16 U.S.C. § 531 (1985). 
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translated into volumes of procedural guidance, but gives relatively little direction as 
to substantive priorities or goals to be obtained. In contrast the state trust lands are 
managed like private property that a trustee directs to be maintained for the benefit 
of a specified beneficiary. This trust mandate will be described in terms of four 
themes: clarity, accountability, enforceability, and perpetuity. 
Next, I will recount four stories—each involving a major trust land 
dispute. My goal is to suggest ways in which the trust mandate might expand 
and clarify our thinking about public resources. Several of these stories may 
suggest that the trust land mandate is a good way—or a lousy one, depending 
on one's perspective—to manage public resources. This paper avoids making 
such sweeping conclusions and argues merely that this extensive—in time and 
space—experience with public resource management ought to be part of our 
lexicon as we debate, yet again, the meaning of public resources. 
State land trusts have a great deal to teach us—understanding their 
management can help clarify issues, identify alternatives, and underscore the 
notion that we have a lot more in our intellectual pantry than the multiple-use 
model mandate that presently characterizes federal lands. 
Four related ideas merit special introduction. Understanding of the centrality 
of the Progressive Era consensus regarding resource planning and management is 
crucial to discussing alternative approaches because it continues to be the 
dominant paradigm. The era of Theodore Roosevelt and Gifford Pinchot was 
characterized by a commitment to rational and national scientific planning for 
resource development. For most of the last century, this commitment has justified 
both government ownership of public lands and a centralized approach to their 
management. It now appears that the consensus and the agencies that embody the 
spirit of the Progressive Era, most notably the U.S. Forest Service, appear to be 
under trenchant, perhaps, finally successful challenge. 
Second, a slightly less explicit set of arguments focuses on the distinction 
between title and control. Although Progressive Era management has 
dominated the public lands debate, it has always conflicted with the pervasive 
commitment to protection of private property and the philosophical supremacy 
of the fee-simple title. Predictably, therefore, a major strand of our nation's 
public lands debate has focused on whether to retain or dispose of the 
remaining federal lands. This emphasis on title begs and conceals more 
important questions about who controls the land and to what ends, an issue 
that this discussion of the state trust lands experience will highlight. 
Writers such as Carol Rose have observed that the relationship between 
title to land and control of that land is often weak or non-existent.4 Western 
ranchers on federal lands have perfected the art of making this distinction work 
to their advantage. Federal grazing permittees have argued for decades that they 
need securer title over their grazing allotments, all the while maintaining 
remarkably effective control over those public lands. Having title to the land 
4. CAROL ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION (1994). 
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often is of surprisingly little importance to who actually controls the use of the 
land.5 Thus, the over-emphasized question of title ownership obscures other 
ways to change or achieve control over public lands. 
Discussions of ownership and control are related to a third theme, the 
geographic location of authority. The appropriate level of decision making has 
emerged with such emphasis in recent years as to constitute a new wrinkle in 
this century long dialogue. Alternatives to current centralized federal 
approaches to land management are being discussed less in the traditional 
context of state versus federal control and more in terms of a search for 
participation options for affected local communities. The current federal land 
management planning process leaves much to be desired for local 
communities, which may be one reason why most innovative local "consensus" 
groups are working explicitly outside that process. Nurturing groups such as the 
Applegate Alliance in Southern Oregon,6 the Quincy Library Group in Northern 
California,7 and dozens of other local planning organizations are unique and 
important strands of the present debate. 
Finally the title/control issue focuses attention on mechanisms through 
which that relationship is defined and enforced. I conclude by suggesting that 
there is enormous understanding to be gained by focusing on the lease as a 
major component of identifying who controls the resources and how. One 
frequently overlooked component of both federal and state land management is 
that the government land owner has uniformly and historically decided not to 
develop the resource itself. Rather, both state and federal land managers lease 
land and resources to private parties who make the necessary investment. For 
many analytical purposes, the canonization of the publicness of public lands 
obscures the issue of who controls them. Because the lease is a common 
instrument on private lands, such focus serves to break down the heavily laden 
emotional distinctions between public and private lands. The lease, 
characteristic of many private land transactions as well, is a method for sharing 
risk, responsibility and returns from resource development. Focusing on the 
lease, its flexibility and variability will enhance our understanding of control and 
diversify the array of tools available to us for managing public resources. 
The state trust lands are an interesting foil for all four of these issues. Because 
the state trust lands generally do not participate in the matrix of management 
5. This is not to say that title is irrelevant - obviously it is not. The federal government has 
sometimes used title as a means to expand real control over the land - through the budget process 
for public lands agencies, for example, and also via laws such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA). 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1985). One could also ask the owners in title of an old-growth forest enjoined 
from logging by the ESA whether their title gives them control over the land in question. 
6. Jack Shipley, Watershed Based Efforts: The Applegate Partnership of Southwest Oregon, Public 
Lands Conference, supra note 2. 
7. Michael Jackson, Sharing Public Land Decision Making: Public Private Partnerships II, 
Public Lands Conference, supra note 2. 
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mandates, goals, assumptions and institutions that form the heart of the 
Progressive Era consensus, a view of public resources that includes them is 
especially fruitful in an era when many have argued that the era's consensus is 
finally about to fall completely apart. Furthermore, because the issue of ownership 
and public benefit is constitutionally defined at the state level, the issue of title and 
control, although it emerges in the trust land context, is significantly different. The 
lease which is clearly central in trust management, can be used to focus on key 
aspects of federal land leasing that are obscured in the present debate. 
The underlying assertion of this article is that the trust lands can be boiled down 
to produce a new and quite instructive soup of perspectives and issues than those that 
have immobilized discussions of federal lands. The trust mandate, which is flexible, 
familiar, and easily adapted to diverse management settings, provides an important 
perspective for approaching the local control component presently so central in public 
resource debates. Neither states nor the trust concept will resolve our public resource 
management debates. Our problems are diverse, deeply regionalized and localized, 
and too complex to justify seeking single, or nationwide solutions. However, if we are 
to avoid yet another round of the disputes so typical of the public lands, we must 
become much clearer about the issues and the alternatives. 
II. Impoverished Intellectual Tools for Discussing Public Resource
Management or How States Came To Be Regarded as "Venal and
Incompetent" and "State Management of Federal Lands" Unthinkable
A. General Intellectual and Political Trends
In the standard discussion of public resource management, the states are ignored 
or vilified. General intellectual and political trends affect how the states are regarded at 
any point in history. Particular components of the public resources arena reflect and 
sometimes intensify those larger political trends. This part presents an overview of those 
trends, and concludes that at present the more virtuous level, or perhaps more 
accurately, which type of government is least objectionable, is not at all clear. 
1. The Early Days of State Supremacy and The Gradual
Expansion of the Federal Government
The states preexisted the central government and were displaced gradually 
and unevenly by the "superior sovereign."8 It is a matter of much discussion when 
this shift occurred. Certainly for most purposes, the Civil War was pivotal. 
In the context that most interests us, the rise of the bureaucratic state in the 1870s, 
particularly the emergence of public resource management and management agencies, 
8. John P. Roach's article entitled, The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action, 55 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 799 (1961), is probably as good a place to start as any. See also CATHY MATSON AND PETER S. ONUF, A 
UNION OF INTERESTS: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1990). 
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was the key period. It was at that point, as historian James. Q. Wilson notes, that growth 
in the federal government began to exceed growth in the postal service for the first time. 
Before the 1870s, expansion of the federal bureaucracy occurred primarily in the Post 
Office, and reflected the expanding geographic reach of the nation. Following the 1870s, 
growth in the federal government could no longer be attributed to growth in the Post 
Office alone. Between 1861 and 1901, more than 200,000 civilian employees were added 
to the federal service, and only 52 percent of them were in the Postal Service. James Q. 
Wilson writes that "what is striking about the period after 1861 was that the government 
began to give formal, bureaucratic recognition to the emergence of distinctive interests 
in a diversifying economy."9 
Historian Robert Wiebe presents an excellent account of this rise of federal 
management.10 He argues that America in the 1870s was a series of "loosely 
connected islands,"11 with little holding the nation together as a whole. Anxiety 
within the nation increased throughout the 1880's and 90's as this localized 
society began breaking down. Economic interdependence and social complexity 
spread from small town to small town along newly developed railroad tracks, 
driven by the growing corporation and monopolies that spawned them. 
According to Wiebe's analysis, the conflict between localities and the 
growing forces of external control climaxed in the 1896 Presidential election—an 
election in which modern-style political campaigning through paid advertising 
and mass media was essentially invented. In this election, the advocates of 
populism and local control went down with their candidate, William Jennings 
Bryan. The ensuing decades instead brought us progressivism—a doctrine 
emphasizing societal reform and unity through a new federal bureaucracy and a 
new reverence for the power of science and scientific management. 
Much of this change was specifically anti-local, putting power in the hands of 
a technical, federal elite where before it had resided at local levels. By 1920, in a 
history familiar to most westerners, the Progressives had created a federal legacy 
that included a new national income tax, a well-established system of national 
forests, and a soon-to-arrive federal grazing service. National control and "scientific 
management" were firmly in place and have remained so until the present.12 
2. The General Decline of the States
The accompanying decline of the states is another, obviously related, long 
and complex story, too rich to do more in this context than point to a few 
indicators. William Riker summarized the situation in his 1964 period piece on 
federalism. "Thus," his study concludes, "if one disapproves of racism, one should 
9. James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic State, 41 PUB. INTEREST 77 (1975). 
10. ROBERT WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967). 
11. Id. at 4. 
12. Id. 
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disapprove of federalism."13 Suffice it to say that states and state rights advocates 
were not viewed as centers of progressive action during much of this century. 
Although it is wholly reasonable to blame the aftermath of the Civil War 
and the residue of slavery for the erosion of the state's efficacy and 
respectability, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), 
summarized a long and impressive line of political science analyses and 
concluded that the states were ineffectual partners in the federal system 
because "they operated under outdated constitutions, fragmented executive 
structures, hamstrung governors, poorly equipped and unrepresentative 
legislatures, and numerous other handicaps.14 
3. What Goes Up Must Come Down
A subsequent ACIR report, significantly entitled The Federal Role in the Federal 
System: The Dynamics of Growth: A Crisis of Confidence and Competence15 suggests that at some 
point in time the tide shifted. The federal government's luster began to erode and 
public sentiment turned cynical, hostile, and more recently, violently opposed to the 
mess Washington. The reformation and modernization of state governments, and 
their increasing efficacy and ambition is another well documented story, one which is 
appropriately supported by reference to the growing state role in environmental 
regulatory programs passed during the late 1960s and 1970s.16 
4. A Motor for These Cycles
This brief passage through standard literature will suffice to suggest the 
contours of the ebb and flow in national perceptions of the relative merits of 
federal and state governments.17 The major mechanism powering this ebb and 
flow is not difficult to discern. Surely it is neither the insightful commentary of 
scholars, nor the useful involvement of that putative umpire of federalism, the 
13. WILLIAM RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155 (1964). 
14. THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IN BRIEF: STATE AND
LOCAL ROLES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 3 (1981). 
15. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IN BRIEF: STATE AND
LOCAL ROLES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH, A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE AND
COMPETENCE A-77 (1980). 
16. Richard Cowart & Sally K. Fairfax, Public Lands Federalism: Judicial Theory and
Administrative Reality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 375, 409-413 (1988). 
17. The literature is on the whole unpalatable; Cakes are the featured analogy. A more
detailed summary, also of my own devising, can be found in Sally K. Fairfax, Old Recipes for New 
Federalism, 12 Envtl. L. 945 (1982). This article was prepared the last time we went through one of 
these Sagebrush Rebellion/federalism spasms and will provide easy access to the earlier literature. 
515 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008 
United States Supreme Court.18 The motor consists of nothing more surprising 
than advocates looking for a better deal: if mother says no, ask grandmother. 
There is a lot of searching in literature, most of it easily dismissed, for inherently 
federal or necessarily state or local functions. We can, largely by force of 
tradition, come up with a few nominees: land use planning and education are 
local; post offices, coinage, and the military, which are federal. 
Interest groups drive the direction of public policy. When an interest 
believes that it can do better for itself by embracing or distancing a specific 
sovereign at a particular time, the balance of power and public policy shifts. 
Further, when one level of government is financially superior to another, the 
balance of power is again altered. For instance, the federal government depends 
on generous receipt and revenue transfers to western states and localities to 
support the establishment of permanent federal land reservations in ostensibly 
reluctant states.19 Presently, as both federal and state governments drastically 
cut expenditures and services, the debate over federal land retention is 
understandably reopened, and the virtues of one form of government, as 
opposed to the other, become less clear. 
B. The Same Cycles in the Context of Public Lands and Resource
Management
For good or bad—and this paper argues that it is for decidedly bad—much of 
the general ebbing and flowing in thought and evaluation of the virtues of one form of 
public land management over another has been lost on students of public resource 
management. The first pivotal period of state ascendancy, during which the template 
for virtually the next 150 years of Congressional policy toward public domain resources 
was formed, has been obscured. Public resource management has become suffused 
with the centrality of the federal government; intellectual models and stories about the 
glory days of the onset of conservation, which is, of course, nothing less than the onset 
of federal ownership and management, dominate our discussion today. Therefore, our 
ability to appreciate the alternatives and options that inhere in an ebb and flow 
between federal and state has been stifled. 
1. The Days of State Dominance in the Public Lands and
Resources Field
Not surprisingly, there was a period when the states were pivotal in decision 
making in the public resources arena. The initiation of the public domain and the 
structure of the first 150 years of federal experience with land disposition were defined 
18. See Cowart & Fairfax, supra note 16, at 380-81, see also Fairfax, Andrews & Buschbaum,
Federalism and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 59 WASH. L. REV. 417 (1984). 
19. Sally K. Fairfax, Interstate Bargaining Over Revenue Sharing and Payments in Lieu of Taxes: 
Federalism As If States Mattered, in FEDERAL LANDS POLICY (Foss ed., 1987). 
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largely by the terms and conditions under which state claimants ceded land to the 
new central government in the early 1780s and by the statutes that the Confederated 
Congress enacted, without authority to deal with the ceded lands. Our preoccupation 
at the close of the 20th century with the federal-ness of the federal lands has obscured 
the degree to which the state land cessions and the General Land Ordinances of 1785 
and 1787 (enactments not under the Federal Constitution but rather under the Articles 
of Confederation)20 were dispositive in defining the next 150 years of public lands 
policy throughout the nation. 
The General Land Ordinance of 1785 provided for the rectangular survey 
and sale of western lands. It also initiated the program of land grants for 
schools, providing that lot number 16 in every township would be reserved "for 
the maintenance of public schools within the said township."21 The Northwest 
Ordinance, passed two years later, provided a system for territorial governance 
and transition to statehood.22 
2. The Withering of the States In Public Lands Policy Discussion 
This high water mark for the states as framers of public lands policy was 
also a rich period of negotiating the nature of the nation. Its present importance 
for understanding both ancient documents (like the Constitution) and the full 
range of choices and alternatives that confronted us then and now, is all but lost 
on modern participants in and students of public lands policy. Part of the 
problem is the troubling tendency of scholars to assert that the acquisition of 
the public domain began in 1805, with the Louisiana Purchase.23 Lopping off the 
first forty years distorts the story and conceals issues, choices, and options. 
A more pervasive problem is the way we present conservation history. When 
referencing the public domain we speak, traditionally, in terms of three periods: 
acquisition, disposition, and retention.24 The normal story line is obvious on the face 
20. See Merrill Jensen, The Cession of the Old Northwest, 23 MISS. V. HIST. REV. 27 (June 1936); PAUL 
W. GATES, PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968). 
SEE ALSO BENJAMIN H. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES (1939); ROY M. ROBBINS, OUR 
LANDED HERITAGE: THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 1776-1936 (1942). For an exhilarating discussion of key issues in 
the 1780s, see Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (1992). 
21. See, e.g., HILDEGAARD B. JOHNSON, ORDER UPON THE LAND: THE U.S. RECTANGULAR 
SURVEY AND THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI COUNTRY (1976); PAYSON JACKSON TREATT, THE NATIONAL LAND 
SYSTEM: 1785-1920, ch. 2 (1910). 
22. See generally, the analysis of the accession process in SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note
1, ch. 2 (researched by Karen Bradley). 
23. GEORGE C. COGGINS, ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 45-6 (1993). 
24. See GEORGE M. STEPHENSON, POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LANDS FROM 1840 TO 
1862: FROM PREEMPTION TO HOMESTEAD (1917) (terms originating in); PAUL J. CULHANE, PUBLIC 
LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON THE FOREST SERVICE AND BUREAU OF LAND 
MANAGEMENT (1981) (fully elaborating upon terms). 
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of the terms: first we acquired land, then we disposed of it, then we began to hold onto 
it. There are a number of obvious flaws in this presentation, most obvious being that 
we are still, at the end of the 20th century, engaged in all three programs. 
However, in the context of this paper, it is most important to note that in 
addition to its obvious misrepresentations, the traditional configuration of 
acquisition-disposition-retention has two corrosive but slightly concealed 
components: (1) it equates federal land retention with the onset of enlightenment, 
and (2) it paints a wildly inaccurate portrait of clearly identified good guys and bad 
(those who supported federal land ownership and those who opposed it). 
There is, of course, an element of truth in the wisdom of retention. The 
rise of science as the basis of public decision making was not an evil idea, and it 
still has defenders. Others, of course, have argued persuasively that the science 
of the progressive era agencies was and continues to be self-serving, clearly 
falsified, and upon reflection, a fairly consistent disaster.25 Nevertheless, the way 
we tell our story puts federal ownership of the resources as the heart, if not the 
totality, of the policy. This leaves us thinking that there is no other option. 
"The acquisition-disposition-retention template" has also had substantial 
consequences for other institutional components of governance. For instance, the 
effects of federal science on local institutions have been enormous.26 Local people and 
institutions were specifically identified as the problem - these centralized science-
based agencies aimed to cure them. It is little wonder then that the rise of national 
government sapped the vitality and legitimacy of state and local institutions and 
denied the federal agents access to locals' experiences with resource and insight into 
local prorates for defining solutions to allocation and management disputes. 
Ironically, scientific management was specifically designed to achieve those goals. The 
emphasis on retention and federal management has always had as a crucial part of its 
assumptions that local folks and local priorities were bad, and the solution to resource 
allocation problems lay in displacing them with scientifically trained representatives of 
the federal government. An essential aspect of the marketing of federal science and 
science-based agencies was, accordingly, the division of the world into good and evil 
participants in the debate. This presumption that the good guys were for "the use of 
science" and the bad guys against, lies like a dense fog over the whole story of 20th 
century conservation.27 
25. See, e.g., ASHLEY SCHIFF, FIRE AND WATER: HERESY IN THE FOREST SERVICE (1960); SHERRY 
H. OLSON, THE DEPLETION MYTH: A HISTORY OF RAILROAD USE OF TIMBER (1971); ROBERT NELSON, 
PUBLIC LANDS, PRIVATE RIGHTS: THE FAILURE OF PROGRESSIVE ERA MANAGEMENT (1995). 
26. See SAMUEL P. HAYS, Conservation and the Future of Efficiency, 275-76 (1960); see also 
Louise P. Fortmann & Sally K Fairfax, America Forestry Professionalism in the Third World: Some 
Preliminary Observations, 11 POP. & ENV'T 259 (1985). 
27. See, e.g., GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION (1910) (excoriating the
special interests) and CHARLES WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN (1992) (inveighing 
against The Lords of Yesteryear). 
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Several points are obvious about this durable screed. First, there is no 
avoiding the plain and simple fact that the shift to federal land retention 
benefited huge segments of the resource management industry, such as it was. 
Large cattle operators embraced a leasing system for "their" public grazing areas 
as a means of excluding homesteaders and sheep operators. Similarly, the 
timber holders were well aware that withdrawing public timber from the market 
would enhance, not diminish, the value of their property. The idea that public 
lands reservations were a victory forced upon a reluctant resources industry by 
aroused conservationists is a half, quarter, or eighth truth. The stereotypes and 
misrepresentations of advocate's interests has confounded reasonable 
discussion of the subject ever since. 
Again, it is appropriate to suggest a motor for this process of concealment 
and miscasting of motives. One hypothesis, fully explored elsewhere regarding one 
small but central aspect of the tale, lays the blame at the feet of lazy historians and 
enterprising bureaucrats.28 The major history of the key "shift to retention" 
legislation, the Forest Reserve Act of 1891,29 was written by Jonathan Ise, at the 
behest of, with the support of, and with full access to the personal files of, Gifford 
Pinchot.30 Ise devised the now familiar "miracle of 1891 and 1897" story of the forest 
reserves - no legislative history can be found; a feckless Congress needed prodding 
from folks like Mr. Pinchot; the provisions of the 1891 and 1897 simply popped out 
and nobody knows where they came from or what they "really" meant.31 Every major 
history of the reserves have subsequently relied upon, and few have done the full 
research necessary to unwind the real roots. My brief sortie was sufficient to 
establish a long and complex legislative history for both acts, and the sad trail of 
footnotes that has pushed Pinchot's self-serving good guys and bad guys tale to the 
level of unquestioned verity.32 
3. Consequences of This Inadequate Intellectual Tool Kit
Our narrow view of public resources and their management has resulted in an 
inflexible academic debate approach to dispute resolution which fails to address 
basic issues of public land management. We have become locked in a series of 
outbursts based on distrust which has deepened preexisting stereotypes. 
One way to underscore the paucity of the debate is to note the failure of 
academics to elucidate the full range of what is possible. Trying to understand 
28. See Sally Fairfax and A. Dan Tarlock, No Water for the Woods: A Critical Analysis of
United States v. New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L. REV. 509 (1979) (discussing alternative views of the 
history of the 1891 and 1897 acts). 
29. 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1891), repealed by Act Oct. 21, 1976, P.L. 94-579, Title VII, § 704(a),
90 Stat. 2792. 
30. JONATHAN ISE, THE UNITED STATES FOREST POLICY 370-1 (1920). 
31. Id. 
32. SEE FAIRFAX & TARLOCK, supra note 28 at 534 and accompanying text. 
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22-50 state programs and their history is a little much to be parceled out in the 
two-to-three year publication cycle that is required at most research 
institutions. It is easier to focus on one or two programs run by one federal 
agency. Hence, very little in the way of comprehensive or comparative data on 
state programs is available. 
When states emerge from these shadows they are frequently slandered. 
One particularly egregious example is a Sagebrush Rebellion era volume by 
Marion Clawson.33 Clawson's unsubstantiated work vilifies state land managers 
and management. Drawing on his own "considerable knowledge of state land 
administration over the past four decades" he writes, with careful indirection, 
about the "state's incompetence and veniality based on many [albeit none 
mentioned] episodes of the past;" he configures the state managers as less 
competent than the federal agencies; "the worst of both worlds: that is still 
public land, not private, and state-managed rather than federally managed."34 
The debate over public land management is also marred by academic 
dishonesty. Frequently, long term participants in the debate are caught arguing 
against their own oft-stated goals or transparent self interest. First, take the case of 
Nevada, where both citizens and diverse government entities have long been leading 
advocates of giving the federal lands to, or less plausibly, back to the states.35 This 
movement thrives in Nevada, despite the documented fact that Nevada is consistently 
among the biggest gainers of federal subsidies on federal lands and would be among 
the biggest losers if the lands were transferred.36 Second, take the case of the ranchers. 
Episodically37 ranchers have demanded the opportunity to purchase or otherwise 
receive fee simple title to "their" federal grazing allotments. However, the reality of the 
situation is that ranchers generally cannot afford to purchase these lands at anything 
approaching the fair market value, nor could they afford to maintain and pay taxes on 
the lands if they were donated to them. Nevertheless, the cry continues.38 
33. MARION CLAWSON, THE FEDERAL LANDS REVISITED (1983). 
34. Id. at 188-189. 
35. State of Nevada ex. rel. Nevada State Bd. of Agric. V. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166 (D. Nev. 
1981), aff'd 699 F.2d 486 (1983); RESOURCE CONCEPTS, INC., IDENTIFICATION OF PUBLIC LAND TRANSFER ISSUES AND 
PRELIMINARY COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1994) (prepared for the Eureka County Board of County 
Commissioners); but see letters from Frankie Sue del Pappa, Attorney General of Nevada to Edward L. 
Perry, County Alliance to Restore the Economy and Environment (Sept. 17, 1993) (Appendix A). 
36. Robert Nelson has been compiling these data for decades, most recently in Essay: 
Transferring Federal Lands in the West to the States: How Would it Work, POINTS WEST CHRONICLE 6 (Winter 
1994-95); see also CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERVICE, BLM REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES (July 28, 1995). One 
flaw in these analyses is that they assume that the states would continue to manage the lands 
under the same circumstances that presently characterize federal land management—that is, one 
is presuming that after taking title to the Carlin Trench gold resources, the Nevada legislature 
would continue to insist that mining interests cannot afford to pay rents or royalties. 
37. Reviewed in COWART & FAIRFAX, supra note 16, at 383. 
38. PUBLIC LANDS NEWS is, over time, an excellent source on this general posturing. 
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It seems likely that the interest groups in Nevada and the ranchers 
understand the issue of title versus control. As Peffer made clear so many 
decades ago,39 the title issue in both cases is likely strategic: By arguing over 
title, interest groups are able to bash the bureaucrats and increase their control 
over the land. However, this focus on title and taking title does not appear to be 
in the interest of either the State of Nevada nor the ranchers. 
Least explicable of all is the consistent rush of environmentalists to defend the 
federal agencies whenever the title issue is raised. Having spent two-thirds of the 20th 
century pointing out, with considerable accuracy and disappointingly less impact, the 
flaws of federal management, those groups' embrace of the federal agencies and their 
stout unwillingness to consider alternatives to federal management is nothing short of 
sad and ironic. It demonstrates the bankruptcy of our ideas on the subject of public 
resources. When pressed, we have precious little to offer each other beyond what we 
already know to be deeply flawed. 
C. Summary
Public lands policy is not the only arena in which the states' reputation and 
potential has been obscured by a presumption that the feds are the government of 
choice. However, difficulties in seeing the states are peculiarly debilitating in the 
public lands field. The inertia in favor of federal retention and federal lands is 
buoyed by its association with the apparently salubrious notion of non-partisan 
technical competence. However soured in the post-Silent Spring40 world, such 
scientific decision making remains a major source of legitimacy in our culture. Our 
inability to see the states clearly leads to the deeply problematic preoccupation with 
federal land retention. This heavily promoted notion sealed us in an analytic void. 
We know very little of any other way to approach resource management, even those 
which have been in place since 1785. As a result, our public discourse on the subject 
is intense, vitriolic, full of destructive stereotypes, and almost utterly beside the 
point. My advocacy of the state trust lands is not proffered as an alternative to 
federal management, but as one method of enriching our impoverished vocabulary 
about public lands. It is one set of alternatives in action; one widely dispersed array 
of experiences that can diversify our notion of what public resources are for and how 
to manage them. 
III. Why Is This Becoming Thinkable
Even after arguing at length that our intellectual tools, and the acquisition-
disposition-retention framework reifying federal ownership makes it extremely 
difficult to discuss public lands issues, or even to frame them in a meaningful way, I 
am nonetheless optimistic about the present form of the debate. 
39. See generally E. LOUISE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1951). 
40. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1963). 
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One important aspect of the currently more nuanced and substantive 
debate can be traced to the evolution of a viable grassroots environmental 
movement. Its position on issues of locus of power and the priorities of public 
resource management are significantly different from the positions of the 
national groups.41 This grassroots environmental dialogue most emphatically 
includes, indeed is in part defined by the fact that it includes, many ranchers, 
and those dependent on western commodities. Perhaps what unites these new 
consensus seekers is a shared antipathy for "espresso by fax"42 but it does 
reshape the conversation to have this new breed in the room. 
A second important and positive variable in the new debate is the 
introduction of economics. This is not, in itself a panacea—in fact, to the 
contrary. There is probably considerably more gibberish being written these 
days about the virtues of free market economics than about the veniality of the 
states.43 Nevertheless, economists, with their diverse tools and propensities for 
evaluating tradeoffs are no longer dismissed as merely the spear carriers of 
commodity interests. Their presence at the table has enriched the discussion. 
A third factor is the gradual encroachment of landscape level thinking. 
Academics and advocates alike have been trying for years to tell the Forest 
Service that they were not the only game in town—that, for example, an even 
flow of logs from national forests would not produce an even supply of timber to 
mills unless the Forest Service were the only supplier. Agency reluctance to the 
contrary notwithstanding, the idea that each parcel of land, regardless of 
ownership, is part of an integrated ecosystem has encouraged a broader 
dialogue about management of all the parcels. This in turn suggests that 
discussing federal land management apart from the management of state and 
privately held land in the same region or watershed is not likely to be fruitful.44 
Fourth, while it is perilous to perform an historical analysis of the present, 
it seems fair to say that we are in another period similar to that described by 
Wiebe circa 1896. American society is again becoming increasingly anxious and 
41. See generally, 9 NORTHERN LIGHTS (Don Snow, ed., Winter 1994). 
42. See, Don Snow Cappucino Cowboy, 9 NORTHERN LIGHTS 3, at 3 (Winter 1994). 
43. Peter S. Menell, Institutional Fantasyland: From Scientific Management to Free Market
Environmentalism, 15 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 489 (1992) provides an excellent introduction to 
the literature and the debate over this issue. 
44. Probably the best discussion of transcending the parcelness and viewing land as 
part of an ecosystem is Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. R. 1433 (1993). See also Myth of the Green 
Blob, in COWART & FAIRFAX, supra note 16, at 410 (for a slightly different take on landscapes), 
and JOHN A. DIXON & LOUISE A. FALLON, The Concept of Sustainability: Origins, Extensions, and 
Usefulness for Policy, 2 SOC'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 73 (1989) (discussing sustainability or 
"ecosystem management"). For a terse distinction between sustainability and sustained 
yield, see Jon A. Souder, et al., Sustainable Resources Management and State School Lands: The Quest for 
Guiding Principles, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 271, 273-78 (1994). 
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upset about the country and the way it has been governed—symptoms of that 
anxiety may be found in the news and at the ballot box. Local-national control 
issues are again in the spotlight. Many would argue that we are witnessing the 
end of the Progressive era.45 Clearly, the conflicts of today share important 
similarities with the ones fought nearly 100 years ago; however the result may 
be quite the opposite. For instance, in 1896, states and localities lost the battle 
for local control. In 1996, on the other hand, there is a genuine interest in 
exploring increased autonomy and self-determination for local communities, as 
well as transfers of control of, or title to, public lands to the states.46 States have 
traditionally been excoriated in this dialogue, but the present era suggests that 
this may no longer be the case. While we have no clearly designated Populist 
candidate running for President (at least, not yet), the issue of local control is 
back on the public agenda in a manner very similar to the era marking the birth 
of the Progressive movement. 
Finally, least noticed in these parts, but ultimately perhaps the most 
important, the observation that the problems experienced in the West are also 
being experienced in the East, and indeed in many parts of the world, is starting to 
refocus the discussion in interesting ways. The fact that these issues of the 
appropriate locus of control over resources are ubiquitous means that the federal 
government is likely neither the cause of all the problems nor the source of all the 
solutions. Obviously, in the western United States, where the federal government is 
the major landowner in many jurisdictions, the federal government will continue to 
play an integral role in public land management. But the fact that many of the same 
issues are also confronted in West Texas, Vermont, Botswana, and Brazil suggests 
that we can over-attend to the fed's presence. 
These five factors are among those that are altering the dialogue beyond 
that structured by the impoverished acquisition-disposition-retention triptych. 
They suggest to me that perhaps we are ready now, to a degree that we have not 
been for most of this century, to think about alternative ways of organizing to 
manage what we have only recently come to think of as "federal lands." With 
that thought in mind, now turn to the core of this paper. 
IV. States as Managers of Lands
The currently renewed quest for alternative forms of public resource 
governance, and especially the emphasis on finding structures and institutions that 
are closer to the ground, suggest that this may be an auspicious time to restore the 
states, their priorities and potential as managers, to an appropriate role in the 
45. See, e.g., COWART & FAIRFAX, supra note 16, in its milder, pre-reinventing government 
manifestation. For a different approach to the same general topic, see ROBERT NELSON, 
PUBLIC LANDS, PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE FAILURE OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1995). 
46. Theresa Rice, Federal Lands and Watershed Based Management Approaches, Public Lands 
Conference, supra note 2. 
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discussion. Unfortunately, the absence of research on state lands limits us to only 
the most tentative generalizations about even such basic facts as the extent of state 
land ownership.47 This lack of information puts a crimp in our discussions of the 
most important aspect of states as land managers. Nonetheless, it is appropriate to 
notice that the states do and/or could play at least two other roles. 
First, it is important to appreciate the role that the states presently play as 
partners, managers and as regulators of lands admixed with federal lands. The 
federal lands do not exist as the green or pink blob that shows up on AAA maps. 
Almost without exception, "federal" holdings are intermixed with significant 
sections of state, private and other federal lands. Second, as a spin-off from 
managing their own lands, states could, and do, frequently act as "little 
laboratories;" sites of experimentation with tools and approaches that spread to 
other states and occasionally even to the federal government.48 
A. State Trust Land Management
The history of state trust lands is treated in detail elsewhere.49 Here, it is 
necessary only to outline the basic principles. Beginning with Ohio in 1803 and 
ending with Alaska in 1959, Congress reserved and then granted to newly joining 
states increasing amounts of land to support common schools and other public 
institutions, such as hospitals and insane asylums. Early grants were to townships, 
and were lost or sold in much the same way as the primary disposal of the public 
domain. However, interest groups supporting public education flourished 
throughout the 19th century and brought increasing pressure on states to retain and 
secure the grant lands. Momentum was added toward orderly approaches to the 
lands when states rather than townships were made grant recipients at mid-century. 
The states established permanent school funds to pool and distribute the 
receipts. This allowed standardization of what constituted a school and signaled 
increasing state level attention to protection and management of the grants, 
which were, probably as a result of the permanent fund paraphernalia, 
increasingly called "trusts."50 The definition and spread of different protective 
47. Randal O'Toole, Why State Lands, 2 DIFFERENT DRUMMER 2 (Summer 1995). 
48. There is fairly interesting political science literature on the subject, Keith Boeckelman, 
The Influence of States on Federal Policy Adoptions, 20 POL'Y STUD. J. 365 (1992) and Jon A. Souder & Sally K. 
Fairfax, Federalism as Little Laboratories, Yes, No, and Maybe: The State School Trust Lands, Presented at the 
1990 Annual Meeting of Western Political Science Association, Newport Beach, CA. The concept 
actually originated with Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., Dissenting); see also DAVID E. OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY (1988). 
49. Sally K. Fairfax, et al., The School Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom, 22
ENVTL. L. 797 (1992) and Jon A. Souder & Sally K. Fairfax, State Trust Lands, 2 DIFFERENT 
DRUMMER 36 (Summer 1995), and the references cited therein. 
50. See O'Toole, supra note 47, at 1 (federal conditions on the grants rather than state initiatives 
are crucial in what he describes as the states "marginally better fiscal manage[ment]." The strings were 
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measures in state constitutions is an example of the "little laboratories" 
principle. Frequently individuals with experience in one state moved west to 
help write the constitutions of subsequent states,51 and brought with them 
knowledge of transfers. 
State trust land management appears to have been dominated by lessees 
and an emphasis on local development, in combination with the professional 
ideologies of the underlying management groups—not all that different from 
federal land management—until the middle of the 20th century. The key dispute 
is described below in Lassen v. Arizona.52 Beneficiaries and concerned trust 
managers successfully sought protection for the school and related trusts in a 
series of disputes throughout the states. 
B. The Trust Mandate
A trust is a fiduciary relationship in which the trustee holds and manages 
property for the benefit of a specific beneficiary. The major obligation of the 
trustee is to act with "undivided loyalty" to the beneficiary. 
The key Arizona case, Lassen v. Arizona Highway Dep't., illustrates the core of the 
trust mandate.53 In Lassen, the Arizona Highway Department sought to use granted 
school lands for a public highway without compensating the trust - this, in spite of the 
fact that the state enabling act which granted the lands dictated that the lands were 
not to be acquired for use for less than their fair market value, and that specified and 
defined the manner in which the lands had to be offered for sale. It had nevertheless 
come to be the tradition in Arizona, and elsewhere, that states simply took school 
lands for highway and related purposes. Not infrequently an offset or enhancement 
argument was made, a common feature of early eminent domain cases of the late 
19th century. The enhancement in the value of the remaining parcel was deemed 
sufficient to repay the property owner for the land taken, hence no compensation was 
required.54 In Lassen, the U.S. Supreme Court announced unmistakably that the lands 
not federal in this instance but the result of state constitutional provisions. Not until 1910 did the federal 
enabling act for Arizona and New Mexico make any discernible attempt at "strings."). 
51. See, e.g., W.H.H. Beadle, Memoirs of W.H.H. Beadle, (Robinson ed., 1906); South Dakota 
Beadle Club, Permanent School Fund in South Dakota and the Beadle Club (1976). The club, 
founded in 1925 to foster support and good fellowship among "schoolmen" of South Dakota and to 
celebrate General Beadle, is still active and continues to protect and enhance the school lands. 
52. 385 U.S. 458 (1966). 
53. When speaking of school and related trusts, the trust referenced is not the public trust, 
which limits the ability of the sovereign to alienate public rights in the bed and banks of navigable 
waters and related resources, but rather a "beneficial" trust, of the kind that an indulgent 
grandmother would instruct a bank officer to manage for the benefit of her grandchildren. 
54. This history is grist for the "givings" topic that seems to be emerging in the
context of "takings." See generally Harry Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the 
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granted in Arizona were a trust that was to be honored, with full and undivided loyalty 
to the designated beneficiaries—common schools and similar state institutions. A 
spate of similar cases, frequently forbidding state legislatures from setting maximum 
prices for trust resources or forbidding managers from allowing or requiring preference 
right renewal of agricultural leases followed.55 
The following four examples summarize the full panoply of trust 
responsibilities under four general headings: clarity; accountability; 
enforceability; perpetuity.56 
Clarity: The trust mandate is clear and simple. The goal is to make the trust 
productive for the specified beneficiary. Because it is crystal clear (relatively 
speaking) what the trustee is supposed to be doing, it is easy (again, relatively 
speaking) to figure out whether or not she is doing it. It is, for example, fairly simple 
to identify investments that have the effect of subsidizing excess management rather 
than benefiting the beneficiary. Under the trust mandate, with a clear and simple 
goal, it is not possible to use returns in one program to subsidize investments in 
another program area where the returns do not justify the commitment. 
Accountability: This is the key to achieving compliance with the clear 
mandate. Again, unlike the federal multiple use agencies, the trustee is 
obligated to deal openly and honestly with the beneficiary and to maintain and 
furnish records about receipts, disbursements, and management. It is relatively 
simple to obtain basic data about trust land management that facilitates 
analysis of whether the trustee is doing her job. 
Enforceability: These obligations have been defined in centuries of 
litigation and judges have enormous experience in the field and proceed with 
vigor to protect the beneficiary. 
Perpetuity: The trustee is obligated to preserve the productive capacity of 
the trust. Although a beneficial trust is not necessarily perpetual (it could end, 
for example, when the grandchild graduates from College), the permanent 
school fund makes the school trusts peculiarly emphatic about the long term 
commitment of trust management. 
Concept of Public Purpose in State Courts, 5 PERSPECTIVES IN U.S. HISTORY 329 (1971) (describing 
treatment of eminent domain in early 1800s). 
55. Nebraska actually beat everybody to the punch with the first of the modern agency
changing cases: State ex rel. Ebke v. Board of Educ. Lands and Funds, 154 Neb. 244, 47 N.W. 2d 
520 (1951). The most recent and interesting cases are probably County of Skamania v. State of 
Washington, 685 P2d 230 (Ok. 1982); State v. University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807 (Alaska 1981); 
ASARCO v. Kadish, 109 S. Ct. 2037 (1989). Here again, I take issue with Randal O'Toole, supra note 
47, who asserts that "state reform is no faster than the slackwater behind a Bureau of Reclamation 
dam." Id. at 2. In the state trust lands field, the opposite appears to be true: a few well placed 
beneficiary originated law suits have radically altered the priorities and the outcomes in state 
trust land offices." See generally SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 1, at 33-36. 
56. See Jon A. Souder, et al., supra note 44 at 278; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §§ 2-
4 (1959); GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS (1987). 
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Without belaboring the obvious, this mandate is significantly different 
from the rather mushy commands and Byzantine procedural requirements that 
afflict the federal land management agencies.57 
C. So What
I have established that state trust lands are different from federal multiple 
use management lands, but does it matter and what can we learn from this 
distinction? I will answer this question, first by recounting three stories about 
disputes involving trust lands that present an array of situations in which the 
trust mandate appears to teach something about alternatives in public land 
management, and second, by returning to my opening remarks lamenting the 
acquisition-disposition-retention triptych. Finally, I urge participants in the 
debate to look more closely at management tools and priorities, as opposed to 
merely questioning who holds title to the lands. Finally, I will focus on the lease 
as an appropriate focus of study and thought. The lease is a core tool of land 
management (state, federal, public and much private) and hence is the 
appropriate unit of analysis for understanding alternative approaches to land 
management, public or private, state or federal. 
1. Subsidizing Agriculture and Grazing in Oklahoma
The first story concerns taking control over the grazing and agricultural 
land leasing program from the lessees. If you are looking for perfection in trust 
lands management programs, you will be disappointed. Nothing about the trust 
mandate indemnifies the managers against the political realities in which we all 
operate. But, the trust mandate has a central role in defining the political 
environment of the debate, which this story underscores. The Oklahoma story is 
a recent, but a classic example of using the trust mandate to shift the balance 
between the lessee and the manager. 
The Oklahoma state legislature had enacted statutes which set maximum 
agricultural and grazing fees, limited the amount of interest the Land 
Commissioners could charge when making farm loans and when selling trust 
property, and allowed existing lessees a preference right to release "their" 
allotments if they were in full compliance with the terms of their lease.58The 
beneficiaries, in the form of the Oklahoma Education Association sued the 
Commissioners, charging that all three legislative enactments violated the state 
constitution. They won on all three counts. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
stated that "[t]he State has an irrevocable duty, as Trustee, to manage the trust 
estate for the exclusive benefit of the beneficiaries, and return full value from 
57. Discussed mercifully briefly in Souder et al., supra note 44, at 276-79 and the many 
references cited therein. 
58. Oklahoma Educ. Assoc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230, 233 n.1 (1982). 
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the use and disposition of the trust property."59 It concluded that "a State may 
not use school land trust assets to subsidize farming and ranching."60 
Respondents asserted that conservation and prevention of waste were also 
important concerns, and that "attainment of maximum return to the trust [was] not a 
controlling factor." The Court agreed, noting, however, that this does not render the 
question of income "an unimportant factor," and asserting instead that "[c]onservation 
necessary to protect the value of the lands leased can be adequately controlled by lease 
provisions and conditions, and by reasonable conservation regulations . . ." rather than 
by "rental discounts" or the ability "to borrow trust funds at below market interest rates."61 
As a result of this decision, Oklahoma went through a protracted and 
painful process which changed the fee structure, established minimum lease 
fees, eliminated preference right leasing and offered expiring leases at auction. 
The result is an 80 percent increase in revenues received by the state. 
Several points stand out. First, subsidies, hidden and otherwise, are 
considerably easier to address on trust lands than on multiple use lands. The 
clarity of the trust mandate, although it does, as the court emphasizes, attach 
great importance to income, can be very effective in plugging leaks in the 
management system. Second, those whose primary concern is land protection 
or environmental quality probably do not care particularly or are not satisfied by 
an 80 percent increase in revenues. They will have to focus on issues other than 
subsidies. The clarity of the mandate helps sort out that strain in the debate. 
Finally, the new system in Oklahoma has required the Commission to increase 
the program staff. Their presence is more than compensated for by the revenue gain—
the trust mandate is no kinder to subsidizing managers than subsidizing lessees. We 
are not in a position to respond to questions about whether increased monitoring of 
lease compliance improves stewardship or resource protection, but it is one worth 
evaluating when weighing the pros and cons of profit oriented management.62 The 
trust lands present a fundamental challenge to the assumption that "for profit" 
management is somehow incompatible with public land ownership. In the clear and 
well understood constraints of the trust mandate, there is arguably a better chance for 
achieving diverse public goals than on the public lands where political influence 
distorts the basic questions of who pays and who benefits. 
2. The Washington Asset Repositioning Program and the
Notion of a Portfolio of Assets
The trust mandate creates a peculiar and interesting spin on issues which 
involve wresting management from traditionally dominant lessees. It has a 
starkly different flavor in preservation vs. development debates, due to its 
59. Id. at 235. 
60. Id. at 236. 
61. Id. at 237-38. 
62. Discussed in SOUDER & FAIRFAX, supra note 1, at 107-09. 
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emphasis on undivided loyalty. The trust creates a tension between general 
public benefit, on the one hand, and benefit for the beneficiary on the other. 
One of the real contributions to this tension is that when discussing trust 
resources, it is imperative to be clear about what constitutes general public 
benefit. Is aesthetic preservation a general public benefit? Is creating jobs, or a 
stable tax base a general public benefit? One of the questions which Nigh 
obscures is whether or not the trust beneficiaries, which are after all, the 
schools, do better when the trust is producing a profit, or when its resources are 
managed to create the strongest possible base for property taxes, which provide 
the vast majority of support for schools. Washington State, which draws the vast 
majority of its trust revenues from timber harvesting, was unable to avoid those 
and similar questions. They responded in a privileged—that is, cash intense—
but suggestive program. 
In Washington's program, revenues earned on sale of renewable resources 
from common school lands is allotted to the school construction fund. In the 
1980s, demand for construction money rose, timber harvests became 
controversial and many areas previously thought to be valuable primarily for 
timber were seen to have "values beyond income production." Many of those 
areas were located on the Olympic Peninsula. The legislature established the 
"Trust Land Transfer Program" which enabled the State Department of Natural 
Resources to reposition its assets while compensating the trust for 
environmentally sensitive areas shifted to parks and maintaining deposits in the 
school construction fund. Basically, the program consisted of appropriations 
which purchased trust lands with high timber and environmental values. The 
timber was not cut. The portion of the value that was attributable to the 
standing timber was deposited in the school construction fund. The land 
portion of the value was retained in the trust to purchase replacement timber 
production lands. And the lands and unharvested timber were turned over to 
the state parks or other appropriate agencies to manage.63 
Superficially, this story underscores the obvious: if you have the money, you 
can buy your way out of many environmental conflicts. There are other, more 
important lessons, however. One is the importance of the attitude that is prevalent 
among state trust managers that they manage assets for a public beneficiary rather 
than specific acres as a sacred trust. The state trust land managers' notion of assets 
rather than sacred acres lends itself to an even more important component of trust 
land management, the notion of the portfolio. The notion of the portfolio invites us 
to put aside the traditional division of attention in public resource management—
focusing agency by agency and resource by resource—and looking instead at all of 
the assets in the trust and how they are managed. 
This is an especially invigorating perspective in the context of the trust lands 
because of the existence of the permanent funds. Again, many people object as a 
63. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, TRUST LAND TRANSFER 
PROGRAM (handout). 
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matter of principle to managing public lands for profit. However, the portfolio concept 
invites inquiry into issues of intergenerational equity and conservative resource 
management that do not come up in the absence of the permanent fund and 
beneficiary. One simple illustration should suffice. If the goal of resource development 
is to produce a high level of returns for the beneficiary, it does not make sense to 
invest in development of resources that will not produce a profit. Further, if the returns 
are placed in a permanent fund, and the fund does not grow at a rate at least equal to 
the inflation rate, then developing the resource does not make sense. Flexibility 
regarding the location and extent of assets is an asset in itself. 
Second, this story underscores the importance of being clear about what 
is being subsidized, why, and by whom. The legislature appropriated public 
funds to make the trust whole; the trust provides a ready and open accounting 
system whereby school construction is not pressured into subsidizing aesthetic 
preservation. Finally, the specific difference between the clarity and 
accountability of the trust mandate as opposed to the decision making process 
on ostensibly public federal lands should be noted. When the beneficiary, or the 
statutory goal of management, cannot be traded away in a political process, it is 
possible to talk clearly about who is paying whom for what, and how much.64 
64. We are much intrigued by the number of trusts that are being established as part of
mitigation programs. See, e.g., THE PLATTE RIVER WHOOPING CRANE HABITAT MAINTENANCE TRUST, INC., THE 
FIRST TEN YEARS - 1979 - 1989 (1989). The trust was set up via a settlement between a region-wide 
power project, the state government, and an environmental group regarding a controversial power 
plant proposal. This trust is the Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust, 
created in 1979. The Platte River trust is directed by three trustees, one appointed by the power 
project, one by the governor of Nebraska, and one by the environmental group involved. The trust 
mission is simply to acquire and preserve habitat for the endangered Whooping Crane, thereby 
permitting a new power project favored by the utility group to be built. To date the trust has acquired 
control over 9,000 acres of land in voluntary purchases, both through fee-simple title and through 
easements. Where it is an owner in title, the trust still leases its property for grazing and farming 
activity. Indeed, these leases are important to the mission of the trust, because the post-harvest corn 
and hay meadows are an important source of food to the protected cranes. Leases are arranged 
explicitly with the goals of the trust in mind, and include provisions such as requiring farmers to 
leave grain residues on the fields to feed the cranes. Payments to the trust from the leasing 
arrangements pay a significant portion of the trust's operating costs, so that the interest from the 
trust's endowment can go directly towards land acquisition. 
The Platte River trust is not a solution without conflict. The trust has become involved, 
for example, in litigation over water rights for the Platte River system. Others in the debate 
have not always been pleased with this aspect of the trust's role. Nevertheless, the trust 
models some of the qualities we have been espousing here as cause for encouragement in 
the discussion regarding public lands management. It is not a large federal bureaucracy. It is 
a small, locally-based organization that acts quickly and efficiently with detailed knowledge 
about local conditions and desires. The trust has remained relatively free of the political 
pressure that dogs federal land managers, however, by virtue of its clear mandate. There is 
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3. The Lease: Tool Kits with Emphasis on The Notion of a
Conservation Buyer
Prolonged contact with the state trust lands has forced an important realization 
upon me. The states, like the federal government (and, indeed, many private land 
holders), have decided almost without exception not to develop the resources under 
their authority. They lease them out to others who bring them to market. Lessees 
(concessionaires, timber purchasers, or whomever) are pretty much the same, over 
time and irrespective of ownership. The lease is a common instrument—one designed 
to allocate risk and rights between the owner and the user or developer of a property. 
This common tool is important because it suggests that it is possible to strip public 
resource management of its historical and emotional mumbo jumbo—such as that 
contained in the ideology of the shift to retention—and talk about the specific terms of 
the agreement that allocate control over a specific resource to a specific individual, 
subject to what kinds of conditions, and for what ends. 
An interesting dispute in Idaho65 underscores the importance of one of the tools 
of trust land management, specifically, the lease. Briefly stated, an environmental 
organization in Idaho, the Idaho Watersheds Project, has been trying, with limited 
success, to lease specific state grazing lands which the organization believes (and 
according to plaintiff's opening brief, the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest 
Service concur) are overgrazed. To date, the Idaho Board of Land Commissioners and 
the Idaho legislature have prevented the organization and its president Jon Marvel 
from obtaining a lease, this in spite of the fact that he has been not merely high bidder 
but apparently the only bidder in one of several contested lease auctions. This dispute 
focuses, among other things, on the importance of talking about tools, specifically the 
details of the lease. 
First, when reviewing this dispute, one should inquire into the bidder 
qualifications. It is typical for land owners to express some minimum 
qualifications before considering leasing property. The land owner wants to 
make sure that the lessee has sufficient qualifications so that they will be able 
to pay the rent. One should ask several questions: What are the qualifications in 
Idaho for bidding on a grazing lease? How do the qualifications relate to the 
goals of the program? How do they compare to the qualifications in similarly 
no confusion about what the trust is doing, or should be doing, among the parties involved. 
Like the state trust managers in Washington, the Platte River trust group manages their 
small holdings with a clarity of purpose and vision that is in marked contrast to the 
multiple-use mandate on the federal lands. The trust is soon to be subject of a master's 
thesis by Darla Guenzler to whom I am grateful for material on this case. 
65. See Unranchers' Reach for West's State Lands, 26 HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 25, 1994, at
C18; Timothy Egan, In Idaho, Wiley Opponent Who Takes on Ranchers, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1995, at 
C18. The story fails to mention that unlike the larger story which it accompanies, the Wiley 
Opponent is working on state lands; see also Opening Briefs, Idaho Watersheds Project, Inc. v. 
State Board of Land Commissioners, No. CV-94-117), appeal docketed, No. 21-774 (1994). 
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situated states and on federal lands? And, who gains and who loses control 
given the bidder qualification requirements? 
Second, one might look at the process for allocating a lease, and its length. 
Does the lease ever expire, in fact or technically? How do others find out about that 
and how do they participate in the process of evaluating and bidding on the lease? 
Who gains control from the lease provisions? Again, a comparison of several 
similarly situated states and the federal government would be illuminating. 
Finally, the dispute raises the question of whether a lessee is allowed to 
not use the grazing lease. Is it permissible under the rules to abstain from 
grazing, or does that amount to forfeiture of the lease? Again, comparing federal 
and state rules would be instructive. 
It is difficult to tell from a distance, but the apparent facts suggest that the 
Idaho Land Board is not acting in accordance with the best interests of the 
beneficiary. The high bidder has been consistently rejected for reasons that have 
no clear basis in the rules or goals of the trust. That is the bad news about trust 
land management in this instance, it is not, as previously noted, immune to the 
political pressures that surround us all. But, the good news is that the question 
has come up. It is more than a little difficult to imagine transporting this 
scenario to federal lands, where bidder qualifications require that you own a 
"base property," where permits do not expire but rather are sold with the base 
property, and where non-use is tolerated but not permitted. It is also difficult to 
see you could unravel these issues to understand what was happening without 
looking at the terms and conditions of the lease. 
V. Conclusion
State land management is not in itself a panacea, nor are state trust lands 
or trust lands in general a model which Congress ought to emulate as a solution 
for disposing of federal lands. States do have diverse experiences in land 
management, however, which are often overlooked and which include the 
flexible management of a surprisingly powerful mandate—public trusts and 
leases. What is impressive in state management is the utility of the trust 
concept in clarifying and addressing a growing number of complex situations. 
Trusts can be managed for a variety of purposes and goals, which makes them a 
flexible and non-partisan tool. One need not agree with the goals of a given 
trust in order to agree that a trust structure in and of itself is often a good idea. 
Nor should one have to agree with all state trust management practices (which 
are as diverse as the many states that practice them) to agree that more 
attention to the states' experience is a good idea. 
In light of this newfound relevance of state land management, it is 
appropriate to be concerned by the enormity of what we do not know about 
state land management and the need to explore further the full range of tools 
and lessons that those diverse programs embody before we reach decisions in 
this debate. Such an exploration would be most profitably aimed at 
understanding the lease as the instrument of management on not only state 
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and federal lands, but as they link public to private lands as well. There in the 
lease, an instrument which is common and well understood, rather than in the 
exotica of particular agency cultures, histories, and planning and management 
programs, we believe we can find tools that work in particular settings to 
balance specific risks and benefits. 
In our explorations we must move beyond the issue of mere ownership of 
the public lands. Considering tools such as the trust and the lease helps us do 
so by requiring us to deal with the more important question of land control 
instead of land title. In particular, questions of improving local control are 
becoming increasingly relevant, regardless of federal or other land title. Attorney 
Michael Jackson of the previously mentioned Quincy Library Group notes that it 
is time that residents of the rural west realize that they have more in common 
with each other than with people three thousand miles away. 
It is worth revisiting the grassroots aspects of my topic once more with a 
slightly different purpose. There is little doubt that much of the dialogue and 
movement on the public lands issues of late have come due to pressure from 
local groups and coalitions of all stripes—local environmentalists (rather than 
national groups) and county-rights activists alike. Indeed, the presence of these 
groups in the discussion is a major reason to hope for a more satisfactory 
resolution this time around. Any debate, therefore, about shifting public lands 
from the federal government to the states or private hands in some ways begs 
an even larger question—how are we better to include truly local priorities and 
values in the land management decision-making system? The federal 
government has demonstrated for the last two decades that public hearings and 
litigation regarding an unending land management planning process is an 
inadequate approach to working with the local community. 
Former Speaker of the Montana House of Representatives Daniel Kemmis 
notes, in his thoughtful work, Community and the Politics of Place66 that it is "an 
insult" to local residents to assume that they cannot solve such resource use 
conflicts themselves. States have in some instances demonstrated a flexibility in 
their land management practices that localities are seeking. Nevertheless, state-
control and local control are not the same thing, nor do state goals and local 
goals always coincide. As the states (or other groups) consider expanding their 
role in controlling or owning the public lands, it would therefore behoove all of 
us to bear in mind the lessons learned under federal control. For while there are 
clearly many goals to consider in managing these lands, and many tools by 
which to do so, surely one of the most important ones is to respect the needs 
and experience of the local communities living within and among them. 
66. DANNIEL KEMMIS, COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE (1990). 
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